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fail to include enough material to provide a good overview. Non-specialists 
may need to supplement it with another, single-author text, as there isn't 
enough explanatory material included for it to stand alone. With these 
caveats, I recommend this book heartily. 
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Many ofus believe that a work ofari has taught us something profound about 
the world. As intuitively strong as this belief can be, it is notoriously hard to 
justify. How can we learn about the world by attending to, say, a novel about 
persons who never existed? Resolving such worries is the aim of James 
Young's Art and Knowledge. Young presents a bold case for 'aesthetic cogni-
tivism', the idea that 'every item properly classified as a work of art can 
contribute to human knowledge' (1). According to Young, 'artworks can 
provide an understanding of aspects ofreality. If so, like science and history, 
art must represent the aspects of the world into which it provides insight' 
(23). In light of this, he has two goals: to outl ine how artworks represent the 
world, and to show that such representation contributes to knowledge. 
Towards the first goal, Young develops the notion of illustrative repre-
sentation. Unlike scientific theories, which represent in virtue of semantic 
conventions, 'i II ustrat.ions represent because an expedence of the illustration 
has something in common with expe1ience oft.he object represented' (26). In 
this manner, artworks can represent not only particular objects, but also 
types; this allows Young to class fictional works as representational. Also 
pivotal is his claim that there is indirect illustrative representation. This is 
crucial because important forms of illustration in literature (descriptive 
illustration ) and music (the representation of emotion) seem to be largely 
indirect, depending on the association of descriptions with character types 
I 50) and the association of forms of motion with emotional states, respectively 
(58). Young's theory of illustration is able to accommodate representation by 
many different art forms, and different sorts of representation within art 
forms. 
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Having established that the arts represent, Young argues that such 
representations give us knowledge. Unlike science, which provides theories 
about the world, the arts provide perspectives: ways of thinking or feeling 
about something. A perspective is not a set of propositions, but rather the 
practice of seeing something in a certain manner. As such, a perspective 
cannot be true, but it can be right, when it 'aids people who adopt it in the 
acquisition of knowledge' (69). Artworks only give us knowledge, of course, 
if the perspective they provide is a right one; just as scientific theories only 
give us knowledge if they are confirmed by evidence, so 'the perspectives 
provided by the arts are in need of justification' (67 ). But how does art provide 
justification for the rightness of the perspectives it offers? According to 
Young, artworks 'can provide illustrative demonstrations of the rightness of 
a perspective. That is, artworks can put audiences in a position to recognise 
the rightness of a perspective' (69). This is in contrast to scientific theories, 
which must be rationally demonstrated by (inductive) argument from em-
pirical evidence. 
So far we know that artworks can deliver knowledge, but must all 
artworks? Young argues that 'art ought to be defined in such a way that only 
items with cognitive value count as artworks' (1). Given that Young is a 
relativist about art, holding that what counts as art is what an artworld 
decides, this is a trivial claim. However, he also offers practical reasons why 
all artworlds should adopt a definition of art in terms of cognitive value. 'If 
everyone acted in h is best interests', he says, 'only one artworld would exjst 
and a ll artworks would have cognitive value' (21). 
The book's final two chapters explore ramifications of this reconceptuali-
zation of art. First Young applies his conception of art to the issue of evaluat-
ing artworks. He admits that 'even the cognitive value of artworks is ... partly 
relative to audiences' because people may find the knowledge delivered by a 
work to be more or less valuable according to their different interests (120). 
Nonetheless, because we have 'objective interests', of which we may be 
unaware, works that provide knowledge serving these have a high value for 
us, however low we estimate their aesthetic worth. Thus the value of 
artworks is not radically relative: some judgements of artistic value can be 
wrong (117). 
Young proceeds to extract 'a few generally applicable criteria of aesthetic 
value', including: 'works of art with a high degree of aesthetic value can 
contribute importantly to the knowledge ofan audience', 'good artworks will 
not be attempts to make statements', and 'a work has high aesthetic value 
only ifit investigates an important subject'. In the book's final chapter, Young 
wields these principles to argue that 'something has gone dreadfully wrong 
in modern art' (134). His target is 'avant-garde' art, which strives to produce 
something 'new and unlike what has previously been produced' ( 137 ). In 
seeking this, it either represents trivial or inappropriate subjects or else 
abandons illustration altogether for bald and often incoherent assertion. If 
devotees of the avant-garde are not uncomfortable by this point, they will be 
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after reading the book's final section, a discussion of whether it is permissible 
to destroy avant-garde a rtworks. 
Yet Young can hardly be accused of philistinism. His knowledge of art, 
and his passion for it, is everywhere evident. He genuinely seems to want to 
help restore dignity, importance and purpose to artists. Perhaps to that end, 
he writes in a clear prose that is accessible to non-philosophers and yet never 
wants for rigour or depth. His book, I suspect, is intended to appeal not only 
to philosophers, but to the denizens of the artwork as well (after all, it is 
principally they who must carry out the revolution for which he is agitating). 
In this regard I think Art and Knowledge succeeds admirably. 
And yet, my worries linger. According to Young, Pride and Prejudice 
justifies the rightness of the perspective 'fi rst impressions a re a poor guide 
to character' because we directly recognise that statements following from 
the perspective are true. But true where? In the artwork? Assuredly not, 
since the perspective of any artwork would be automatically demonstrated. 
True everywhere, in virtue of some necessary connection between concepts? 
Surely not; this is clearly an empirica l matter. In our experience, perhaps? 
Occasionally Young seems to endorse this response (88). Perhaps, if I re-
flected, I would realize that statements that follow from the perspective are 
true in my experience. Does this give me justification for the perspective? It 
seems the most I can say is that the perspective rings true to me. Does it lead 
to truth in any contexts beyond the narrow confines ofmy daily life? Maybe, 
but the artwork gives me no basis for thinking so. 
This criticism, based upon one example, by no means does justice to the 
subtlety or scope of Young's discussion of illustrative demonstration. None-
theless, on the whole it does seem that Young's heavy reliance on this 
non-rational capacity to simply 'recognise' truths undermines his position. I 
would not speak for others, but what I can grasp without the aid of rational 
argument or any evidence beyond my personal experience is pretty limited 
and uninteresting. If aesthetic cognitivism must come to this, perhaps the 
game is not worth the candle. 
This recalcitrance notwithstanding, Art and Knowledge is a wonderful 
read: a persuasive, erudite, and entertaining attempt to confront a problem 
that is too often brushed aside with empty mottos and wishful thinking. 
Perhaps you too have lelt this problem in your bones, and wonder ifit can be 
resolved. Read this excellent book, and 6nd out. 
Glenn Parsons 
University of Toronto 
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